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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
Shabtai Rosenne
If international law is conceived as a
standard-setting regulatory pattern for
the nonnal conduct of states towards
one another, the question of international law and the use of force--of the
relationship between law in force-belongs not to its static parts, but rather
to a more dynamic and, truth to tell,
less clearly rcgulated area. Here the
essential problem is to balance the
dictates of a civilizing, outward-looking,
standard-selling agency with the overriding introspective requirements of
national security and self-defense. That
is the real problem which force and the
threat or use of force pose for international law. It is, moreover, the intractable nature of that conflict which leads
many to the mistaken view that when
reduced to fundamentals, international
law is either unimportant or, at best,
belongs to the category of moral standards and not those of law in the sense
of imperativcs. This dilemma is similar
to that referred to ill a recent article in
the New Yorker (7 Sl!ptemlH:r 19GB) Oil
the trial of Dr. Spock where the fol/owing selltcncc appl~ar:::; "The ca~ was
simply too palpably cntwincd with controversial political issues--with the question of dove versus hawk-for its legal
form and its social eonten~ to bc separahle." That sentcnce also uLlers the
words of caution agaillst the banality
which is all too frequcnt in legal and
political science literature dealing with
the vexed problem of force. I·'or it can
be taken for granted that no responsible

government will lightly decide on the
employmcnt of armed force, and it is
thc height of irresponsibility to approach the legal system with platitudes
on the evils of force. Moreovl:r, the
dilemma of the hawk vcrsus the dove is
not confined to anyone country or to
anyone period of time. Insofar as
intcmaLional law gives expression to
certain social experiences and, in the
view of many, to certain essen tial requirements of the civilized world, it,
too, has to face this dilemllla.
[n the history of international law
sevcral phases can hc observed ill its
approach to the problelll of force. Certain aspects which are taken for granted
today were not always so, just as today
we face new problems for which therc is
little historic experience to guide us.
But running through all this history is
the persistent attempt to halance the
legitimate requiremcnts of national
defcnse and security and the equally
legitimate requircllll!nts of the civilized
world which regards the indiscriminate
usc of force with distaste and seeks to
place it hcyond the pale not merely of
the law, hut of normal internatiolla[
rclations.
The first stage ill tempering the rigors
of the usc of force and subjecting it to
legal restraint goes hack to quite all
early period of civilization. This rdatcs
to the protection of the noncomhatant,
whether civilian or the sick and wound-cd Illi[itary. Traccs of this type of
humanitarian legal regulation can be
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found in the Bible, in the teachings of
the church fathcrs and in comparable
works of olher civilizations. They find.
forlllal expression today in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. Although this
humanitarian aspect is peripheral to the
een Lral problem, the history of this
humanitarian law is inLeresting bccause
it can illustrate the ccntral problcm of
our thcmc. That branch of the law has
as its assumption that it is possible to
make a elear and a logical distinction
between the combatant and the noncombatant. But the experiences of
modem Lotal wars·-whether they arc
World Wars or wheLher Lhey arc localized wars--east scriuus doubts on the
the assumpLion. If that is so,
validity
as regards what is no more than a
segment of the problem, it follows that
the central problem itself is also colored
by the same eharacteristie_ For many
smaller peoples, loss of a war may mean
Lhe loss of naLional independence, or at
least a fundamental change of the naLional destiny in to new directions im[losed by the vicLors. It is the naLural
unwillingness of peoples to submit forcibly to such changes which makes the
problem of the legal regulaLion of the
usc of force one of such delicacy and
difficulty, and which makes it, in the
words of the New Yorker so "impossible for its legal form and its social
content to be separable."
It may he an oversimplification to
state that the topic helongs to the
dynamic area of internaLional law. IL
concems the dynamics of human intcrcourse and of in ternational relations in
gencral. It is relatively easy to draw up a
legal text such as the Charter of the
United Nations and refer to respect for
the territorial intehrrity or political independence of any state. The assumption
of these texts is that the very conceptions of "territorial integrity" and "political independence" when applied to
concrete situations are inherently static
and immutable. It may hc true that, in
general, law is by nature inclined

or

towards the maintenance of stahility.
But the relaLionships with which we arc
dealing arc themselves not static, and
the consccration of stability in the
words of a text may end up by being
mere platitudes. A complicated variety
of factors converges to make changes,
and particularly territorial changes, almost inevitable. Many of the situaLions
of conflict existing in the worhl today
can be traced Lo causes of Lhis kind, just
as in other parts of the world siLuaLions
of Lranquillity or relalive tranquillity are
explained precisely by the absence of
these factors for rapid and forceful
change_
Does this mean that no reconciliation
at all is possible between law and force?
It is doubtful if a negative answer is
justified_ The experience of the present
century seems to be showing the way in
wh ieh a reconeiliaLion could be
achieved.
InLelleeLual and in formed pacifi$m,
as opposed to purely ellloLion:ll, illeological, and dogmalic pacifist 1l10Vt~
menLs, has in thc last hundred ycars
looked in two directions as it approaches towards the creation of an
international order which, when it is
constructed, will contain built-in clcments enabling it to cope with Lhe
inherent dynamism of international relations. The first is the search after
acceptable international machineries for
facilitating the necessary changes in the
international status quo, the so-called
problem of "peaceful change." The
second is the attempt to regulate the usc
of force itself by a mixture of polilical
machinery and legal controls.
If each of Lhese approaehe$ must he
treated separately as a matter of systematic presentation, in fact as well as in
intellectual conception, they arc inseparable. Indeed, in their modcrn bruise
the two approaches brrew out of a single
intellectual endeavor, being the reaction
of a small woup of farsighted men-lawyers, statesmen, and officers of Lhe
armed forccs--who were able to ob:1erve
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in the year 1f170 on the one hand the
two major contincntall·:uropean powers
tl~arin~ thclII::1dvcs to pieecs in a short
but devastating war, and the two leading
English-speaking powers, themselves on
the verge of war, pulling back at the last
moment and settling their differences
by arhitration_ The Franco-Prussian War
and the A labumu arbitration took place
almost silllulLaneously.
The approach to the regulaLion of
peaceful change startcd with the idea
that apart from the secondary, ami, in a
way, technical aspects of improving the
actual formulation of intemational law
(a process which, .by the way, has
produced very significant results during
the last 20 years in the specialized area
of codification of international law
with, indeed, a highly sophisticated
mechanism for this process), new internationalized institutions to substitute
themselves for the individual wills of the
1'00'I·rt·i~IIS in dl'alin~ with this typl\ of
::;ituation mu::;t he (·::;tablished mill made
operational. Apparently on the basis of
what was thought to be the lesson of
the organic social development which
led to the creation of the modern state
as we now know it, what was looked for
was a way to centralize the control of
force in the intemational area, much in
the same way that inside each state
private forcc is not allowed, and all
controlled force is theoretically dependent upon the government. This was
paralleled with the creation of new or
improved international machineries for
peaceful change and dispute settlement.
These machineries fall into two general
p:ILLerns: namely, thoSI\ whose functions
arc es::;entially limited to factfinding
(the theory being that in many cases the
impartial establishment of controverted
facls may itself lead to the settlement of
Ilisputcs), and those aiming at the creation of more far-reaching regulatory
mechanisms involving particularly
machineries for conciliation and mediation and machincries for arbitration and
even int('rnational judicial settlement--

corresponding to some extent in pmcLice, thou~h not Iwees::;arily in theory,
to the political role perfornwd by the
national legislature inside the states.
Regardless of technical and characteristic differences between these different
institutions, their underlying approach
is the same: namely, that the parties in
dispute should have to lay their cards on
the table, clarify their objectives, and
leave it to third parties to find the
reconciliation, whether by mere persuasion or by more compulsive means.
Experience has shown that in producing these machineries, for which
some of the forms of internal state
organization were taken, their essential
substance could not easily be transferred into the international area, mainly because of the tremendous impact of
national sovereignty and the concept of
the sovereign equality of states. In all
modern states the central authority has
at its disposal force which can be used,
and is used, both to prevent breaehcs of
the law and to enforce decisions of the
dispute-settlement organs inside the
state. This is the manifestation, on the
internal plane, of the concept of "sovercignty," and this has its international
parallels too. In normal cases this works
without much diffieulLy. The police in a
criminal case and the bailiffs or the
sheriffs in a civil case exist to ensure
that the adjudged person carried out
what he is supposcd to do. Yet, in
complicated situations with dcep political and social overLoncs this system does
not work so well. This can be illustrated
by reference to two areas of social
conflict frequently involving the lise of
force, with which the modern sLate
system is showing itself increasingly
unable to cope on the basis of traditional patterns. The first is the area of
labor relations, and the other is the area
of race relations. In both of these areas
of confliet--as well as in others--legal and
t r ad i t i onal governmental processes,
while they may have immediate efficacy. rarely are able to get to grips with
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the root causes of the tensions and by
their failure to do this produce a kind of
chain reaction in thc form of contempt
and frusLration Lowards the law enforcement and cven the lawmaking processes,
if not towards society iLself.
These two particular areas of social
tensions arc close to the type of international tensions which endanger peace;
and if the relatively closely integrated
national societies are engaged in deep
heart searching to find appropriate ways
of handling thesc tensions and removing
their explosive potentialities, how much
greater are the differences in the uncohesive inLernational community.
The second approach has turned
more directly to the problem of force
itself. It was at one time thought, for
instance, that disarmament hy itself
would go a long way towards providing
an answer to the problem, but disarmament was not effective between the two
World Wars, possibly because it took the
symptom for the cause, and the international debate on disarmament did not
touch the roots of the suspicions and
fears which have made the massive
armament of nations so commonplace
today.
At the same time the international
community has been groping towards a
form of organization which will supply
political machineries to deal with the
situaLions of tension and maintain international peace. This international effort
today is epitomized by the United
NaLions. This is, in iLs external trappings, a highly sophisticaLed international administrative machinery, but in
substance it is not very different from
Lhe morc discreet sysLem of preserving
international peace of the Concert of
Europe. The underlying theory in each
case--and herein lies one explanation for
the so-called right of veto in the Security Council today-is that the big
powers, in fact and not merely in
theory, bear the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international
peace. This theory worked well enough

so long as the big powers were able to
regulate their own relations between
themselves. If it has not been effective
since 1918, this is mainly because tllllY
have not been successful in regulating to
the fullest extent their own relations.
In thc hrrowth of this systcm the
formal tex ts are now based on Lhe
proposition that war, as a matter of
national policy, is renounced. In whatever form the proposiLion is to ue
framed, whether as in the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 192B, which now exisLs in
reviscd language in articlc 2, paragraph 4
of the U.N. Charter, or in the form of
the so-called Stimson I)oclcine of nonrecognition of territorial changes
brought about by the illegal use of
force, or in the so-called Litvinov formula of nonaggression, the proposition
is one which will hardly stand up to
critical analysis; furthermore, the superficial attraction of the slogan-like language blinds the unwary to the unreality
of the proposition. It depends far too
much on interpretation which, except
when you have agreed intcrprcLaLion, is
at uest a highly controversial exercise
and at worst no more than a decoy for a
naked political power sLruggle.
Tcxts of this kind-perhaps stating
the obvious-explicitly rescrve what the
United Nations Charter calls the inhcrellt right of self-defense against
armed attack. The formulas used vary,
but their purpose remains the same. The
idea is that in principle the aggressive
use of force is renounced as an instrument of national policy, but that if, in
spite of this ban, anoLher staLe employs
forcc, its victim is legally entitled Lo
defcnd iLsclf until the organizctl international society takes appropriate measures to put a stop to Lhc violations of
peacc.
In the Charter this system is based on
three assumpLions, namely: (a) that the
Security Council--the orgau 011 whieh is
c{)lIfl~rred primary rcsponsibiliLY for Lhe
mainLenance of international peae(: and
sl'l"uriLy--wuuld ha\'(: aL iLs 11i:;posalnon-
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JllilillirY and JIIililllry mllchineries of
cOJllpulsion which il could usc 'l~lIinst
n'caldlrnnt slale~: (b) that the Security
Council would have a sufficiently united
sense of purpose in the discharge of its
primary responsillilily, that it would lle
prepared to usc these machineries
through the devil:es of nonmilitary or
military sanetiom; when faced with
threatened or actual breaches of international peace and security; and (c) that
the Security Council would be objectively capable of determining when an
unlawful breach of the peace has occurred. Sidc by side with the Security
Council there exists au all Imt defunct
Military Staff Committee (which, in
faet, has nevcr met except on formal or
social occasions) whose function, according to article 47 of the Charter, is
to all vise anll assist the Security Council
on all questions relating to the Council's
military requirements for the maintenance of intemational peace and
security, the employment and command
of forces placcd at its disposal, the
regulation of armamcnts, and possiblc
disarmament. That is the teeth of the
theoretical system of collective security
establish cd at San Francisco in 1945
with its groping attempt at the centralization of force on the international
level. The U.N. Charter, taken simply as
a text, appears to be a stronger document than the League Covenant, professing to learn from the failure of
collective security as coneeived in the
inlerwar period by comhining political
procedlm:s for peaceful change wilh
military proccdures for the main tenancc
of peacc.
Taking the Charter as a lcgal text,
attention may be called to two major
and in terconncclcd problcms of interpretation for which the solution is still
elusive. The two notions requiring definition and interpretation are the central
oncs of "aggression" and of "force."
The main problem of the definition
of force is whether it should be limited
to arJIIllll force (which, of course, is

fairly_ easily identifiable), or whl!lher,
for till: purpo~es of constructing an
ade"quatc mOll ern interlllliional ordl'r,
Ihe concept is now a broader one
altogether, including such intangillie elements as psychological, cconomic and
political pressures. If therc is a strong
reaction today, and rightly so, against
the "gunboat diplomacy" of thc 19th
century, there is an equally strong rcaction against its so-callcd "gin-llottlc
diplomacy"; for the ,,'Tcat colonial empires now disintegrating are said to have
been established by a sinful combination of these two methods of cocrcion.
Most of the countries of the world are
militarily and economically weak, and if
the matter is approached simply as one
of head-counting in international conferences, in which all states participate
on a footing of formal equality, there is
little doubt that the majority, indeed
the overwhelming majority, with memories of Munich (1938) very much in
their mind would prefer the broadest
possible interpretation as including all
forms of prcssure which one state can
bring upon another. £n practical terms
this is obviously quite unreal; just as in
ordinary human rclations pressures can
be used quite legitimately, until the fine
dividing line of the illegal area of undue
pressure is reached.
The question of the definition of
aggression has heen undcr international
discussion since the late 1920's, although it is actually older and is connecteil with treaties of guarantee and of
nonagl,'Tession. In terms of the discipline
of thc law, the necessity for a definition
of this term is now s;id by its proponents to arise from the ohligation of
members of the League of Nations, or
today of the United Nations, to come to
the assistance of the victim of aggression
within the framework of the concept of
collective security. It has been said, for
instance, that a definition of aggression
would assist the Security Council in its
work, though this suggestion is undoubtedly tendentious.
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Thcrc is no difficulty over the obvious and hlal.<lIIt ea8es of direct ai!/-,>Te8sion, which can em;ily bc ob8crvecl and
listed. The difficulty ariscs over thc far
more dangerous and insidious forms of
indirect ag/-,>Tession deliheratly carricd
out in a way which enablcs a government 10 dcny rcsponsihility for thcm.
Techniques of this kind werc commonly
used in Europe as tensions preceding
World War 11 were building up, and they
have continued to bc used ever since.
Words like "Auslandsdeutsche" in the
Nazi period, "Volunteers" in the Korean war, or "Fedayeen" or "EI Fatah"
in the Middle I~ast illustrate this. These
phenolllena also illustrate in practical
terms the prohlcm of the so-called
preventive war and the risks (0 international peace and security which arc
created, if one thinks of defining aggression in exclusively enumerative terms.
Such a definition of aggression is appropriate, perhaps, for the identifiable
instances of direct aggression but quite
inappropriatc if one takes a broAder
look at the whole problem of the
international regulation of the usc of
force.
On the whole, the Security Council
as an organ operating collectively and
the powers represented on it working
individually have displayed a marked
reticence towards formally condemning
a state as an aggressor, even in quitc
obvious cases, except where, for some
fortuitous eireulllstanee, the parliamentary situation was favorable to one
point of view as in the case of Korea in
.I une 19;'0, and even then the North
Korean action was called only a "hreaeh
of the peace." There arc at least two
explanations for this. One is the deep
political eleavage existing among the
permanent members of the Security
Council which is responsible for the
noncreation of international peacekeeping forces at the disposal of the Security
COllneil sllch as are envisioned in the
lLN. Charter, and in general for the
Council to act as planned in the CharLer.

In the major conlliels which have conw
hefore the United Nations since 194;',
the (Jivisions between the major powers,
derivin~ from the deep clash of inlerests
in terms of glohal stratehries, have prevented them ever heing at one and
saying that an act of aggression hm;
taken place, or that joint and univ('rsal
action was needed to restore the peace.
The second is a maller of diplomatic
tcehnique. If the objcetive is the restoration of peace and the adjustment of a
situation that has given rise to serious
tcnsion, pejorative asscrtions that one
side ~or another had hecn guilty of
agh>Tession arc not likely to be hdp ful in
terms of reaching a ~etllemenL. Instead
of this we find the Security Council
adopting a more pragmatic approach
and concerning itself rather with prevcnting the spread of violence and bringing it to an end than with condemning
states. This has been coupled with the
virtual ahandonrnent by the Security
Council of any idea that it could Icgislate a new situation into existence. This
has been left to the parties, the international organizations at best providing a
set of rcconllnended i!uidclincs. In the
same line of thought, internatio/llIl1y
controlled and internationally composed military forces have been created
ad hoc and have operated under the
United Nations flag, working not under
the compulsory powers of the Security
Council hut by agreement of the states
concerned, something which the lI.N.
Charter did not foresee. I\lany tlrink
that ill the long ru n tlris is a morc
sa ti sf a etory approach towards intractable problems, and one doser to
intemational realities, than any allclIlp t
to opcrate the Security Council as
though it were a kinu of world policeman intervening automatically to prevent real or threatened breaches of the
peace and a world legislature dictating
settlements.
One of the common techniques to
cover up the lise of force in forcign
relations is that of intervention at tire
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invitation of thc rcsponsible authorities
in~ mechanisms in comparison with
what was the position as liLLie as half a
of an invaded statc. Armcd intl'rvcntion
is nothing new in international relations,
century ago. Pcrhaps the greatest adit being thc traditional man ncr in which
vance has becn in the realization that an
strong states imposed thcir wiII on
adequate legal order can only be constructed on the basis of a realistic
weakcr statcs or prcvented the emergcnce in wcaker slatcs of elements • approach which fully recognizes on the
hosti"~ to their own polieics. Today,
onc hand that no self-respecting nation
under the regimc of the lI.N. Charter,
will jeopardize its supreme national inintcrvention of this type is hanned. It is
terests, as it conceives them, on the altar
in order to overcomc that ban that the
of legalism or idealistic perfectionism,
proccll nrc has becn evolved by which a
and on the other that there do exist
govcrnmcnt "invites" some outside
collective interests beside the egoistical
pOWl'r to scnd in its armccl forces to
interests of the individual states. This is
"protcct" it. Somctimes this happcns
undoubtedly balanced by the fact that
whcn intcrnal turllloil lIIay threatcn the
thanks to the destructive force of
internal rcgimc without necessarily Icadmodern weapons and the totality of
ing to a change in the general internamodern war the subjective weighing of
tional orientation of a state; at others,
the national interest is a far more
thc internal turmoil may even be prodelicate and profound operation than it
duecd or accompanied by external eleappears to have been even as late as
ments themselves aiming at producing a
1939. To overcome the present suspichange in the country's external orientacions and fears is a major political task
tion. In the first type of case, where the
which the lawyer is perhaps not the best
international status quo is not really
equipped to perform. Indeed, one might
threatened, this form of intervention,
easily say that just as war is too serious
while not commendable, may not ala matter to be left to the generals, so is
ways be open to serious reproach, prothe international legal regulation of
vhled the invitation to intervene is real,
force and its various manifestations too
that it leaves thc government in eomserious a matter to be left to the lawyers
and politicians. The U.N. Charter atllland of the situation and is not cxeesternpte~, on the basis of its pragmatic
sive, and that it is terminated as soon as
approach to the matter, to combine the
feasihle. The other type of case, on the
other hand, will have serious internapolitical, economic, legal, and military
aspects under the aegis of the Security
tional repercussions, possibly of the
Council. For political reasons the origimost far-reaching kind. Nevcrthelcss,
the fact that the intervention is in
nal scheme has failed, and its replacerl:l'ponsc to an apparcntly authoriz(:d
ment has not yet begun to take clear
invitation from some rcsponsible aushape. But that it can only be based on
thority may be of purely nominal sigthat kind of combination of profesnificance.
sional talents and interests is now
The reader may detect in this artiele
widely recognized. When that ideal
a tone of pessimism, as though the
situation wiII have becn reached, the
lawyer and diplomat are resigning from
world will be in a beLLer position to
their professions in face of the enorprovide effective international mamous problems confronting them. But
chinery for making objective determinasuch a conelusion would be premature.
tions of whether the supreme national
There is no doubt that the international
inlerests are at stake. So long as that
society, with all its deep-rooted schisms
determination is left to the individual
and hcterogeneity, has advanced a long
subjective appreciation of each state, as
way in strengthening the peace-preservit now inevitahly is, the matter is going
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to be left to politicaljudgmcnt with thc
law following suit.
In the dcvelopment of the concept of
collective security, with its concomitant
of sanctions against the state guilty of
the breach of the peace, the naval arm
of the armed forccs occupies a prominent place. !':or many centuries the
naval forces have formed the main
instrument by which force has been
brought to bear (except as far as concerns the immediate Iimitrophe states).
Furthermore, as a syllabus in the Naval
War College puts it, naval force provides
the dynamics for "bilateral as well as
multilateral and often abrasive confrontations between discreet sources of
power and military force." It is frequently overlooked today that many of
the details of the concept of sanctions
as they exist in books about the League
of Nations and in certain official papers
of the United Nations have their direct
inspiration from the economic warfare
measures applied by the Allied and
Associated Powers during each of the
two World Wars, in which the naval
forces played a key role. The old system
of prize law, now largely relegated to
the limbo of naval and legal history
(where it makes fascinating reading),
provides the inspiration for much of the
contemporary conccptions of collective
applications of sanctions, and even of
individualized applications of force, in
exceptional circumstances. The quarantine of Cuba has its historic parallels in
the Anglo-French economic warfare in
the Napoleonic wars, in the long-

distance blockade of thc American Civil
War (thc Alabama arbitration pmviously
mentioncd was an outgrowth of that),
and in the e1aboratc controls of all
seabornc tradc initiated by the Allies in
1914 and perfectcd in 1940, and in
post-194.5 controls of the movcment of
strategic materials from one part of thc
world to another.
It is stated in the Naval War College
syllabus that the naval officer must be
in a position with sureness and firmncss
to understand, evaluate, and cffcctivcly
cxploit Lhc legal advice and counscl
which he solicits. The naval officer is
not, of course, the only public servant
to which that admonition should apply
(it should certainly apply to the diplomat). If Lhis article has conveyed Lhc
impression that thcre is littlc firm in the
legal rules governing the employment of
force, one may at the salllc time safely
assume that a rcsponsible govcrnmentand one cannot legislate for irresponsible governments--will determine the
limits of the freedom of action of a
commander in any military or quasimilitary action, and that adroit use of
modern communications in unforeseen
situations, in thc context of thc /!:eneral
humani:t.ing mission of the contemporary intcrnationallaw, wiII provide a fair
course on which to sail. For in the final
result, intcrnational law, like all law, is
common sense writ largc, amI C0ll11110n
sense couplcd with good faith goes a
long way towards remedying formal
deficiencics which thc unsatisfactory
state of contemporary law exhibits.
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